Treble Damage Actions for Violation of Section 7 of the Clayton Act: The View After \u3ci\u3eGottesman v. General Motors\u3c/i\u3e by Feinsmith, Sherry R.
Loyola University Chicago Law Journal
Volume 1
Issue 2 Spring 1970 Article 7
1970
Treble Damage Actions for Violation of Section 7
of the Clayton Act: The View After Gottesman v.
General Motors
Sherry R. Feinsmith
Follow this and additional works at: http://lawecommons.luc.edu/luclj
Part of the Antitrust and Trade Regulation Commons
This Note is brought to you for free and open access by LAW eCommons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Loyola University Chicago Law Journal
by an authorized administrator of LAW eCommons. For more information, please contact law-library@luc.edu.
Recommended Citation
Sherry R. Feinsmith, Treble Damage Actions for Violation of Section 7 of the Clayton Act: The View After Gottesman v. General Motors, 1
Loy. U. Chi. L. J. 298 (1970).
Available at: http://lawecommons.luc.edu/luclj/vol1/iss2/7
TREBLE DAMAGE ACTIONS FOR VIOLATION OF
SECTION 7 OF THE CLAYTON ACT: THE VIEW
AFTER GOTTESMAN V. GENERAL MOTORS
INTRODUCTION
During the past several years, the private treble damage antitrust
action has gained considerable importance as an effective means of en-
forcing the antitrust laws. Most government-instituted actions simply
do not cost large corporations enough to serve as an entirely effective
bar to monopolistic practices. The relatively small fines which may be
levied are of little consequence to the major corporate entities which are
among the most common violators of the antitrust acts.'
However, the unpleasant prospect of a drove of plaintiffs' counsel
bringing a plethora of private antitrust actions based upon a successful
government action or, in certain circumstances, independent thereof,
has caused justifiable consternation in the executive suite. The multi-
hundred million dollar recoveries in several of the more notorious recent
episodes2 have served to provide a far more effective deterrent to conduct
violative of the antitrust laws than the mere threat of government action.
1. Sherman Act § 1, 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1964), provides for the following penalties,
Every person who shall make any contract or engage in any combination or
conspiracy hereby declared to be illegal shall be deemed guilty of a misde-
meanor, and on conviction thereof, shall be punished by fine not exceeding
fifty thousand dollars, or by imprisonment not exceeding one year, or by both
said punishments, in the discretion of the court.
It should be noted that the criminal sanctions which are, at best, infrequently en-
forced, are available only for violations of sections 1 and 2 of the Sherman Act and
that there are no criminal penalties for violations of the Clayton Act. See Report
of President Nixon's Task Force on Productivity and Competition, Cong. Record
(June 16, 1969 p. 56472), 5 CCH TRADE REG. REP. Par. 55250, at p. 55521. See also
Lovinger-Private Action-The Strongest Pillar of Antitrust, 3 AirTxTuST BULL. 167
(1958). The current administration has recently indicated a desire to increase the fines
to a level which are still low. Speech by Attorney General John N. Mitchell,
B.N.A.-A.T.R.R. 429:a-4 (Sept. 30, 1969). H.R. 14116 providing for fines of
$500,000.00 has been passed by the House and is presently pending before the Senate.
2. Atlantic City Electric Co. v. General Electric Co., 207 F. Supp. 620 (S.D.
N.Y. 1962). In Re Plumbing Fixtures, Philadelphia Housing Authority et als v.
American Radiator and Standard Sanitary Corp. et als, 5 CCH TRADE REG. REP. Par.
73,013 (E.D. Pa. September 24, 1969). Philadelphia Electric Co. et als v. Anaconda
American Brass Co. et als, 43 F.R.D. 452 (E.D. Pa. 1968) where defendants paid
over $22 million in settlement. Minnesota v. U.S. Steel Corp. et als, 44 F.RD 559
(D. Minn. 1968); Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Howard R. Hughes, 5 CCH Trade Reg.
Rep., Par. 73,017 (S.D.N.Y. December 23, 1969) where an award of $137,611,435.95
was granted in a treble damage action; State of West Virginia v. Pfizer & Co. et al,
68 Civil 240 & related cases (S.D.N.Y. 1969) commented upon in A. Pomerantz, New
Developments in Class Actions-has the death knell been sounded? 25 Bus. LAWYER
1259 (1970), and in the Wall Street Journal, April 17, 1970, at 4, column 2. This
class action against several pharmaceutical companies resulted in settlements aggre-
gating over $120 million. The beneficiaries were millions of overcharged consumers
and the public at large.
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The expenditure of legal time and the consequent cost to the cor-
porate client (defendant) in large private antitrust actions is astronom-
ical.8 The disruption of the corporate files and the time spent by cor-
porate officers in testifying at depositions and at trial is a cost of incal-
culable dimension to the firm involved.
Until recently, most private treble damage actions have been based
upon violations of provisions of the Sherman Act, or provisions of the
Clayton Act other than Section 7.4 However, in recent years plaintiffs
have attempted to bring these private actions based upon the anti-mer-
ger provisions of Section 7 of the Clayton Act where one need only
prove a potential, rather than an actual, effect on competition.5 To
3. See Philadelphia Electric Co. et als v. Anaconda American Brass Co. et als,
(E.D. Pa. August 1, 1969) 1969 TRADE CASES Par. 72,892, where the 89 plaintiffs
were required to pay 25% of their total recovery of $22,175,000 as attorneys fees; and
TWA v. Toolco, - F. Supp. -, 1970 TRADE CASES Par. 73, 142 where attorneys fees
of 7.5 million dollars were awarded. See also Farmington Dowel Products Co. v.
Forster Mfg. Co., Inc., 297 F. Supp. 924 (D. Me. 1969), remanded and modified 5 CCH
TRADE REG. REP. Par. 72994 (1st Cir. December 10, 1969), where the court engaged
in an extensive discussion relative to the concept of reasonable attorneys fees in a
treble damage action, and particularly, Appendix 1 thereof, at p. 92 entitled, "The
Attorney's fee in relation to amount of single and trebled damages." These costs have
been accentuated by the trend toward large class actions brought under RULE 23(b)(3),
F.R.C.P.
4. Karseal Corp. v. Richfield Oil Corp., 221 F.2d 358 (9th Cir. 1955) (Sec-
tions 3 and 4 Clayton, Section 1 Sherman); Bigelow v. RKO Radio Pictures, Inc., 327
U.S. 251 (1946) (Sections 4 and 16 Clayton, Sections 1, 2 and 7 Sherman).
5. Clayton Act § 7, 15 U.S.C. § 18 (1964)
Sec. 7. That no corporation engaged in commerce shall acquire, directly
or indirectly, the whole or any part of the stock or other share capital and no
corporation subject to the jurisdiction of the Federal Trade Commission shall
acquire the whole or any part of the assets of another corporation engaged
also in commerce, where in any line of commerce in any section of the coun-
try, the effect of such acquisition may be substantially to lessen competition,
or to tend to create a monopoly. [October 15, 1914, Chap. 323, See. 7, 38
Stat. 731; December 29, 1950, Chap. 1184, Sec. 1, 64 Stat. 1125; 15 U.S.
Code, Sec. 18.]
No corporation shall acquire, directly or indirectly, the whole or any part of
the stock or other share capital and no corporation subject to the jurisdiction
of the Federal Trade Commission shall acquire the whole or any part of the
assets of one or more corporations engaged in commerce, where in any line
of commerce in any section of the country, the effect of such acquisition, of
such stocks or assets, or of the use of such stock by the voting or granting of
proxies or otherwise, may be substantially to lessen competition, or to tend to
create a monopoly. [October 15, 1914, Chap. 323, Sec. 7, 38 Stat. 731;
December 29, 1950, Chap. 1184, Sec. 1, 64 Stat. 1125; 15 U.S. Code, See. 18.]
- This section shall not apply to corporations purchasing such stock solely for
investment and not using the same by voting or otherwise to bring about, or in
attempting to bring about, the substantial lessening of competition. Nor shall
anything contained in this section prevent a corporation engaged in commerce
from causing the formation of subsidiary corporations for the actual carry-
ing on of their immediate lawful business, or the natural and legitimate
branches or extensions thereof, or from owning and holding all or a part of
the stock of such subsidiary corporations, when the effect of such forma-
tion is not to substantially lessen competition. [October 15, 1914, Chap. 323,
Sec. 7, 38 Stat. 731; December 29, 1950, Chap. 1184, Sec. 1, 64 Stat. 1125;
15 U.S. Code, Sec. 18.]
Nor shall anything herein contained be construed to prohibit any common
carrier subject to the laws to regulate commerce from aiding in the construc-
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date, treble damages have not been awarded in any such case based
upon a violation of Section 7 of the Clayton Act.
In construing the Clayton Act, contrary to the hopes of the private
plaintiffs, some courts have gone so far as to express doubts as to
whether Section 7 thereof was even an "antitrust act," at least as that
term is used in Section 4 of the Clayton Act. However, a recent deci-
sion by the Second Circuit Court of Appeals in Gottesman v. General
Motors Corp.' seems to have resolved certain of the problems involved
in favor of the application of Section 4(b) to private plaintiffs and to
have recognized an important private antitrust remedy to be available
for Section 7 violations. This article will discuss the primary issues
raised by the collision of these two positions.
Section 4 of the Clayton Act provides, in pertinent part, that:
Any person who shall be injured in his business or property by
reason of anything forbidden in the antitrust laws may sue there-
for. . . and recover threefold the damages by him sustained ... 7
tion of branches or short lines so located as to become feeders to the main
line of the company so aiding in such construction or from acquiring or own-
ing all or any part of the stock of such branch lines, nor to prevent any
such common carrier from acquiring and owning all or any part of the stock
of a branch or short line constructed by an independent company where there
is no substantial competition between the company owning the branch line so
constructed and the company owning the main line acquiring the property
or an interest therein, nor to prevent such common carrier from extending
any of its lines through the medium of the acquisition of stock or otherwise of
any other common carrier where there is no substantial competition between
the company extending its lines and the company whose stock, property, or
an interest therein is so acquired. [October 15, 1914, Chap. 323, Sec. 7, 38
Stat. 731; December 29, 1950, Chap. 1184, Sec. 1, 64 Stat. 1125; 15 U.S.
Code, Sec. 18.]
Nothing contained in this section shall be held to affect or impair any right
heretofore legally acquired: Provided, That nothing in this section shall be
held or construed to authorize or make lawful anything heretofore prohibited
or made illegal by the antitrust laws, nor to exempt any person from the
penal provisions thereof or the civil remedies therein provided. [October 15,
1914, Chap. 323, Sec. 7, 38 Stat. 731; December 29, 1950, Chap. 1184, Sec.
1, 64 Stat. 1125; 15 U.S. Code, Sec. 18.]
Nothing contained in this section shall apply to transactions duly consum-
mated pursuant to authority given by the Civil Aeronautics Board, Federal
Communications Commission, Federal Power Commission, Interstate Com-
merce Commission, the Securities and Exchange Commission in the exercise
of its jurisdiction under section 10 of the Public Utility Holding Company
Act of 1935, the United States Maritime Commission[X] or the Secretary of
Agriculture under any statutory provision vesting such power in such Com-
mission, Secretary, or Board. [October 15, 1914, Chap. 323, Sec. 7, 38 Stat.
731; December 29, 1950, Chap. 1184, Sec. 1, 64 Stat. 1125; 15 U.S. Code,
Sec. 18.1
See also S. Rep. No. 1775, 81st Cong. 2nd Sess. at 6; 51 Cong. Rec. 14464 (remarks
of Senator Reed) as follows: "A requirement of certainty and actuality of injury to
competition is incompatible with any effort to supplement the Sherman Act by
reaching incipient restraints."
6. 414 F.2d 956 (2nd Cir. 1969).
7. Clayton Act § 4, 15 U.S.C. § 15 (1964).
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By its own terms, the Clayton Act is an antitrust act. Most recent
authorities concur in this interpretation.' Nowhere in the Act itself
does it appear that Section 7 is an exception to the rule that a treble
damage action will lie for an antitrust violation. In fact, prior to the
decision of the court in Gottesman v. General Motors Corp."0 it had
apparently been generally assumed that such an action would lie under
Section 7.11 However, the holding in Gottesman I altered that trend,'"
and it was not until the reversal of Gottesman I by the Second Circuit
Court of Appeals in 196911 that a court unequivocally held that Section
7 would provide a private cause of action for treble damages.
Those courts which follow the rationale of Gottesman I have based
their reluctance to provide a private treble damage remedy for Section
7 violations on the following three factors. First, the courts have re-
ferred to the statutory language itself, which provides that:
No corporation . . . shall acquire . . . the stock . . . or any part
of the assets of another corporation . . . where . . . the effect of
such acquisition may be substantially to lessen competition, or to
tend to create a monopoly. 14
The Supreme Court in Brown Shoe v. United States 5 found the statute's
purpose to be preventative, based on the "may be" language contained
therein.' 8 This so-called "incipiency" test, which will be discussed later
8. Section 1 of the Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. § 12 (1964), defines antitrust laws
as including "this act."
9. J. SCOTT AND E. ROCKEFELLER, B.N.A.'s ANTITRUST & TRADE REGULATION
TODAY, 340 (1967); Julius M. Ames Co. v. Bostitch Inc., 240 F. Supp. 521, 523(S.D.N.Y. 1965); Gottesman v. General Motors Corp., 414 F.2d 956, 961 (2d Cir.
1969).
10. 221 F. Supp. 448 (S.D.N.Y. 1963); leave to appeal denied (2d Cir. Jan. 31,
1964); cert. den. 379 U.S. 882 (1964) where the court held that a violation of
Section 7 of the Clayton Act cannot support a private cause of action for money
damages. For the purposes of clarity and convenience, Gottesman v. General Motors
Corp., 221 F. Supp. 488 (S.D.N.Y. 1963), will be referred to herein as Gottesman I
and Gottesman v. General Motors Corp., 414 F.2d 956 (2nd Cir. 1969), will be re-
ferred to as Gottesman 11.
11. ScoTr AND ROCKEFELLER, supra note 9. See also Rayco Manufacturing Com-
pany v. Dunn, 234 F. Supp. 593 (N.D. Ill. 1964) where the court granted summaryjudgment dismissing a Clayton Act cause of action only because the plaintiff was
unable to show injury, proximately caused, and Blaski v. Inland Steel Company, 271
F.2d 853 (7th Cir. 1959) where the court found the proof offered to be insufficient to
recover for a violation of Section 7.
12. See 64 COLUM. L. REV. 597 (1964) where the following language appears:
The availability of the treble damage remedy in a private suit for violation of
Section 7 seems never to have been specifically questioned prior to the instant
case (Gottesman I), although the courts have upheld such complaints against
motions to dismiss.
13. Gottesman v. General Motors Corp., 414 F.2d 956 (2nd Cir. 1969), rev'g 249
F. Supp. 361 (S.D.N.Y. 1967).
14. Clayton Act § 7, 15 U.S.C. § 18 (1964).
15. 370 U.S. 294 (1962).
16. In Brown Shoe, Id. at 323 the court stated, "... Congress used the words
'may be substantially to lessen competition' to indicate that its concern was with
probabilities, not certainties."
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in the article, has been the rationale for several decisions.' 7
A second factor set forth by a few courts as a reason for their refusal
to provide for treble damages has been the allegedly speculative nature
of the damages. For example, the district court in Bailey's Bakery
Ltd. v. Continental Baking Co.'8 held:
Since Clayton § 7 is concerned with the future monopolistic and
restraining tendencies of corporate acquisition . . . any damages
claimed for prospective restraint of trade would be purely specula-
tive, and a plaintiff cannot recover money damages for anticipated
but unimplemented acts of restraint which may invade its inter-
ests. 19
Lastly, it has been suggested that Section 4 of the Clayton Act should
be strictly construed by the courts in view of the severity of the nature
of the treble damage remedy.2" Under such a narrow view, the remedy
would have no possible application to a section 7 violation,21 since Sec-
tion 7 merely directs itself to potential, rather than actual injury.
HISTORY OF THE LITIGATION IN THE GOTTESMAN CASE
In the original government antitrust proceeding against Dupont, 22
the Supreme Court held that DuPont's commanding position as a
supplier of automotive finishes and fabrics to General Motors ren-
dered its acquisition of a substantial portion of General Motors stock
violative of Section 7.23 DuPont owned 23% of the common stock of
General Motors. The Court reasoned that by virtue of the controlling
ownership of DuPont and its commanding sales position the acquisition
of the stock violated the Act because it raised a reasonable probability
that a monopoly would be created. 24  Subsequently, after the case had
wound its way through the lower courts again, the Supreme Court held
that the only proper remedy would be complete divestiture by DuPont
17. Bailey's Bakery Ltd. v. Continental Baking Co., 235 F. Supp. 705 (D. Hawaii
1964), aird, 401 F.2d 182 (9th Cir. 1968); Highland Supply Corporation v. Reynolds
Motor Company, 245 F. Supp. 510 (S.D. Mo. 1965); Gottesman v. General Motors
Corp., 221 F. Supp. 488 (S.D.N.Y. 1963).
18. See note 17, supra.
19. Id. at 717.
20. Highland Supply Corporation v. Reynolds Metal Company, 245 F. Supp. 510,
514 (E.D. Mo. 1965); Twin Ports Oil Co. v. Pure Oil Co., 119 F.2d 747, 751 (8th
Cir. 1941).
21. 221 F. Supp. at 493.
22. United States v. DuPont, 353 U.S. 586 (1957).
23. During the years covered by the government litigation, DuPont supplied 67 and
68% of General Motors' requirements for finishes and 52.3 and 38.5% of its fabric
requirements.
It should be noted that the litigation here involved section 7 as it existed prior to the
1950 amendments. In the context of this article, however, the amendments are not
significant.
24. 353 U.S. at p. 607.
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of its General Motors common stock holdings. 5
In 1957, soon after the original Supreme Court decision, a stock-
holders' derivative action was brought against DuPont and General Mo-
tors by certain General Motors minority stockholders. 26  Plaintiffs' con-
tention was that DuPont had utilized its stock control to insure its
position as primary supplier of automotive fabrics and finishes to Gen-
eral Motors. Plaintiffs further contended that this tactic had pre-
vented competition from other potential suppliers of such goods, which
enabled DuPont to sell the products to General Motors at excessive
prices. General Motors (and the stockholders) would thus have been
injured in the amount of the overcharges which resulted from the posi-
tion DuPont enjoyed by virtue of its improper stock ownership. The
district court held, on a pretrial motion to dismiss the Section 7 count,
that a violation of Section 7 of the Clayton Act did not constitute a cause
of action for money damages.2 The court based its decision primarily
on the theory that "the test of a Section 7 violation is whether there is a
reasonable probability that the acquisition is likely to result in the con-
demned restraint,"28 and that as the plaintiff could not be damaged by
a potential restraint of trade, there could be no recovery.
The plaintiffs' claim under Section 7 was dismissed and was certified
for appeal to the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit.
The court of appeals denied leave to appeal29 and the Supreme Court
denied certiorari." After extensive pretrial and discovery proceedings,
the remaining claims were tried in 1966 and 1967 and final judgment
against the plaintiffs was entered on March 29, 1968. The court of
appeals denied defendants' motion to dismiss plaintiffs' appeal. 31
The plaintiffs' successful appeal attacked the district court's original
dismissal of their Clayton Act cause of action in his pretrial opinion of
September 18, 1963. Thus, thirteen years after the commencement
of the action, the parties were back in their original positions.
CASE DEVELOPMENT SUBSEQUENT To GOTTESMAN I
Highland Supply Corp. v. Reynolds Metals Co. 3 1 was the first opinion
to rely on Gottesman I. This private antitrust action involved a large
25. United States v. DuPont, 366 U.S. 316 (1961).
26. Gottesman v. General Motors, 221 F. Supp, 488 (S.D.N.Y. 1963).
27. Id. at 493-"There can be no claim for money damages for a violation of
Section 7."
28. Id.
29. Leave to appeal den. (2nd Cir. Jan. 31, 1964).
30. 379 U.S. 882 (1964).
31. 401 F.2d 510 (2nd Cir. 1968).
32. 327 F.2d 725 (8th Cir. 1964).
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aluminum producer which had acquired a leading florist's foil manu-
facturer, and was based on alleged violations of Section 7 of the Clayton
Act and Section 2 of the Sherman Act. The Eighth Circuit Court of
Appeals reversed the district court's dismissal of both causes of action
on other grounds 3 but noted in a footnote: 4
We think that any effort to convert Section 7 of the Clayton Act
into a per se violation of the antitrust laws so as to give rise to a
private cause of action under the Clayton Act has been squarely
checked . . . no private cause of action accrues from such a vio-
lation. (emphasis supplied).
On remand, the Section 7 cause of action was dismissed by the District
Court for the Eastern District of Missouri, which relied on the foot-
note quoted above. The court said:
The crucial matter remains that the prohibited acquisition, stand-
ing alone, caused no present, compensable injury. If the policy of
causation in treble damage actions is to encompass injuries re-
sulting from acts made possible by a violation of Section 7, the
horizon would not be restricted simply to acts and injuries nearly
simultaneous with the prohibited acquisition.35
Further, the court cited with approval the decision of the court of ap-
peals to apply a narrow concept of causation in an action for treble
damages.
In Bailey's Bakery Ltd. v. Continental Baking Co.3 6 a complaint was
filed by a Hawaiian Bakery Corporation against a Hawaiian subsidiary
of a mainland corporation, for both Sherman and Clayton Act viola-
tions. The District Court for the District of Hawaii, dismissed the count
based on Section 7 of the Clayton Act for failure to state a cause of
action, employing the following concept in reaching its decision:
The prohibitory sanctions of Clayton Section 7 are triggered to
explode by and at the moment of acquisition. That, after the mo-
ment of acquisition, subsequent business practices do injure com-
petitors in the market does not, because of those subsequent injuri-
ous acts, give rise to a claim for treble damages under Clayton
Section 7.37
A subsequent case, Julius M. Ames v. Bostitch, Inc. 38 seems to have
33. 221 F. Supp. 15 (E.D. Mo. 1963). The court based its reversal of the lower
court's decision on the decision of the Supreme Court in Minnesota Mining, 381 U.S. 311(1965), to the effect that an FTC proceeding tolls the running of the § 4b statute of
limitations. (The case had originally been dismissed as being barred by the running of
the statutes of limitations).
34. 327 F.2d, at 728 n.3.
35. Highland Supply Corp. v. Reynolds Metals Co., 245 F. Supp. 510, 513 (E.D.
Mo. 1965).
36. 235 F. Supp. 705 (D. Hawaii 1964).
37. Id. at 716.
38. 240 F. Supp. 521 (S.D.NY 1965).
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employed a similar line of reasoning, carving out a narrow exception
to the rule set down in Gottesman I. In this private antitrust action,
plaintiffs were the sole distributors of certain metal fastener devices
produced by Calwire. Calwire was acquired by defendant, the existing
distributorships were cancelled and distribution was taken over by the
defendant. The court held that a private action for money damages
might, in fact, be maintained under Section 7, if the injury occurred
substantially at the moment of the allegedly illegal acquisition of stock.
The court distinguished the earlier cases (i.e., Gottesman I, Highland
and Bailey's Bakery) reasoning that in those cases no actual injury had
occurred and damages, if any, were purely speculative. In the Ames
case, however, the court found immediate and present damage.A9 It
would appear then, that the decision in Ames stands for the proposition
that a treble damage action may be brought on a Section 7 violation
only in those instances where the injury immediately follows the statu-
tory violation.4" The court in Ames seems to have focused primarily
on the time at which the injury occurred, rather than the somewhat
broader concept of proximate causation. This approach has moved
one commentator, in analyzing the Ames decision, to remark:
The relevant consideration in each case is not the time at which
the damage occurred but whether plaintiff's damage occurred 'by
reason of the illegal action.' 41
In spite of the limitations of the time-oriented approach utilized by
the court in Ames, certain other aspects of the court's decision seem
to lay the foundation for possible future treble damage recoveries based
upon a Section 7 violation. First, the court declares firmly that the
Clayton Act is unquestionably an antitrust law.42 Second, it held that
Section 4, in providing for a private treble damage remedy, is not to be
narrowly construed.43
Two years after the decision in Ames, the Fifth Circuit decided the
case of Dailey v. Quality School Plan, Inc.44 Dailey was, at least prior
to the court of appeal's decision in Gottesman II, the clearest expres-
sion of the view that a violation of Section 7 would support a claim for
treble damages.
39. Id. at 524.
40. Stein, Sec. 7 of the Clayton Act-As a basis for the treble damage action:
When may the private litigant bring his suit?, 56 CALIF. L. REV. 968 (1968).41. 79 HARV. L. REV. 445, 446 (1965). See also 42 S. CAL. L. REV. 460 (1969)
which criticizes the time-oriented approach employed by the court in Ames.
42. 240 F. Supp. at 523 where the court states that "The Clayton Act is an anti-
trust law."
43. "It is also settled that Section 4 is not to be narrowly construed. The provision
is basic to the effective enforcement of the antitrust laws." 240 F. Supp. at 525.
44. 380 F.2d 484 (5th Cir. 1967).
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Unlike the decisions in Bailey's Bakery and Ames, however, the court
focused primarily on the issue of proximate causation. It indicated
that:
If a plaintiff can show himself within the sector of the economy in
which the violation threatened a breakdown of competitive condi-
tions and that he was proximately injured thereby, then he has
standing to sue under Section 4.45
In rejecting the defendant's motion to dismiss, the court stressed that
the pivotal issue concerning which the plaintiff had pleaded sufficient
facts was "[W]hether the defendant's asserted conduct was the
proximate cause of the plaintiff's asserted injury." 6  In so deciding the
court seemed to implicitly reject the time oriented approach used in
Ames.
47
Minnesota Mining & Manufacturing Co. v. New Jersey Wood Fin-
ishing Co.48 is the only United States Supreme Court case which has
any direct bearing on the issue of the applicability of a treble damage
remedy for a Clayton 7 violation. That case involved a private treble
45. Id. at 487 (quoting South Carolina Council of Milk Producers, Inc. v. Newton,
360 F.2d 414 (4th Cir. 1966) a Sherman Act Case). The court in Dailey also held
that a Section 7 violation did, in fact, come within the purview of Section 4 of the
Act, citing, i.e., Ames v. Bostitch, supra note 38.
46. The injury alleged by plaintiff (the termination of his employment) did not
occur until some five months after the merger was consummated. 380 F.2d at 485. For
a recent decision which appears to follow the rationale enunciated in Dailey, but en-
larges its inquiry to determine whether the allegedly illegal acquisition was actually
or merely potentially anti-competitive, see Sam S. Goldstein Industries, Inc. v. Botany
Industries, Inc., 301 F. Supp. 728 (S.D.N.Y. 1969). This was an action for trademark
infringement, inter alia, wherein plaintiff alleged violations of Sherman 2 and Clayton
7. The court dismissed the case based primarily on plaintiff's failure to make
sufficient allegations regarding damages. The court did state that an individual might
bring a private action for damages based upon a Section 7 violation (301 F. Supp. at
735), distinguishing Gottesman I on the following theory.
Its reasoning (Gottesman I) is inapplicable to this case in that plaintiff here
alleges that the 1956 acquisition was unlawful because it in fact restrained
competition, not merely because it had that potential. If plaintiff can
prove actual restraint, its damages, if proven to result proximately from the
actual restraint, would not be speculative. (301 F. Supp. at 735).
But see Isidor Weinstein Investment Co. v. Hearst Corp., 303 F. Supp. 646 (N.D. Calif.
1969) a treble damage action brought by a retail store owner which was dismissed by
the court on a motion to dismiss where defendant's contention was sustained that treble
damages could not be recovered for violation of Section 7, relying heavily on Got-
tesman I as a basis for the decision.
47. There is another line of cases which has indicated the possible existence of a
private treble damage action under Section 7, but in each of which the respective
court has determined that there had not been a sufficient showing of proximate in-
jury. See, e.g., Rayco Manufacturing Co. v. Dunn, 234 F. Supp. 593, 597 (N.D. Ill.
1964), where the court indicated that: "Under Section 7 of the Clayton Act, a civil
suit may lie upon a showing that 1) the acquisition did or reasonably might substan-
tially lessen competition or create a monopoly, and 2) the complainant suffered some
special damage to his business as a direct and proximate result of the acquisition."
See also Blaski v. Inland Steel Company, 271 F.2d 853 (7th Cir. 1959); Bender v.
Hearst Corporation, 263 F.2d 360 (2nd Cir. 1959), and Kogan v. Schenley Industries,
Inc., 20 F.R.D. 4 (D. Del. 1956). None of these cases reached the ultimate decision as
to the existence of a Section 7 private treble damage remedy.
48. 381 U.S. 311 (1965).
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damage action based on both Sherman and Clayton Act violations re-
sulting from a previous Federal Trade Commission proceeding to en-
force Section 7 of the Clayton Act. The primary question before the
Court was whether or not an F.T.C. proceeding was a suit by the
United States, within the terms of Section 5(b) of the Clayton Act,
which tolls the running of the statute of limitations for a civil antitrust
proceeding during pendency of a suit by the United States.49 The
Court, in affirming the district court's refusal to dismiss for failure to
state a cause of action, did not specifically discuss the question of
whether a private antitrust treble damage action might be based on a
Section 7 violation. However, its silence has been interpreted as indi-
cating that such an action might properly be brought.50
GOTTESMAN II ON APPEAL
Finally, we come to the recent holding in Gottesman v. General
Motors Corp.51 where the Second Circuit Court of Appeals reversed
the district court5" which had held that no private action for treble
damages would lie for a violation of Section 7 of the Clayton Act. It
indicated that:
[A] violation of Section 7 of the Clayton Act does furnish a basis
for a claim for money damages under the broad language of Sec-
tion 4 of the Act . . . the basis of the pretrial ruling (in Gottes-
man II) was that a Section 7 violation can cause no damage be-
cause it establishes only that the harm was threatened, not that it
occurred. But if the threat ripens into reality we do not see why
there can never be a private cause of action for damages. 53
As a part of the basis for its decision in Gottesman II, the court of
appeals relied on the two points previously referred to with respect to
the decision in Ames, to wit: that Section 7 of the Clayton Act is an
antitrust act and that Section 4 of that act, affording treble damage
relief to private parties, should not be narrowly construed. The court's
approach seems to parallel the causative analysis of Dailey rather than
the time-oriented approach of Ames in connecting the plaintiffs injury
to the defendant's violation. By applying the broader theory of causa-
tion the Gottesman II court thus focused on the question of "why" the
49. 15 U.S.C. § 16(b) (1964).
50. Gottesman v. General Motors, 414 F.2d, at 960, "... although the issue was
not discussed, the Court evinced no qualms about dealing with a Section 7 money dam-
age claim."
51. 414 F.2d 956 (2nd Cir. 1969), rev'g 279 F. Supp. 361 (S.D.N.Y. 1967) for
background of litigation, See p. 298 et seq., supra.
52. 221 F. Supp. 488 (S.D.N.Y. 1963).
53. 414 F.2d, at 961.
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injury occurred rather than that of "when" it occurred.54
In order to analyze adequately the appellate court's decision in
Gottesman II, it is necessary to look to the legislative history of the
Clayton Act. Initially Section 4 of the Clayton Act (which superceded
Section 7 of the Sherman Act) created a new damage remedy available
to private parties." It clearly appears that the purpose of Section 4
in providing for a private treble damage remedy was threefold:
1. to aid in self enforcement of the antitrust laws,
2. to create the deterrent effect of incurring possible treble dam-
age liability, and
3. to compensate persons actually injured as a direct result of the
alleged antitrust violations.56
Nowhere in the history of the act is there found any indication that any
of these purposes would be served by excepting Section 7 violations
from the scope of the Section 4 remedy.
The history of the act fails to lend any support to the proposition
that the incipiency test is the sole basis for establishing a violation of
Section 7.17 While the intention of Section 7 was originally to
reach effects "beyond those prohibited by the Sherman Act, extending
to the reduction of the competition which had previously existed be-
tween the acquiring and acquired companies,"58 the legislative history
of the 1950 amendment to the act makes it clear that the primary pur-
poses of the amendment were: 1) to assure a broader construction of
the fundamental provisions of the act 9 ; and 2) to "plug any loopholes"
54. Two recent district court cases relying on Gottesman II determined on motions
that a violation of Section 7 of the Clayton Act furnishes a basis for a claim for money
damages under Sec. 4 of the Act. See Metric Hosiery Co. v. Spartans Industries, 5 CCH
TRADE REG. REP. 73, 119 (S.D.N.Y. March 1970); Western Geophysical Co. of
America v. Bolt Associates, Inc., 305 F. Supp. 1251 (D. Conn. 1969). Both cases are
still pending as of the date this article was written
55. 38 Stat. 731 (1914); 15 U.S.C. § 15 (1958). Section 7 of the Sherman Act
was repealed in 1955, Ch. 283, Sec. 3, 69 Stat. 283 (1955).
56. Standing to sue for treble damages under Section 4 of the Clayton Act, 64
COLUM. L. REV. 570, 571 (1964) which also states that:
They (the courts) repeatedly emphasize that the treble damage action was
intended not merely to redress a personal injury, but to aid in achieving the
broader purposes of the antitrust laws.
See also U.S. v. Bordon Co., 347 U.S. 514, 518 (1954)
The private injunction action, like the private treble damage action under § 4
of the Act, supplements government enforcement of the antitrust laws ...
and see Lawlor v. National Screen Service Corp. et al, 349 U.S. 322, 329 (1955) where
the court speaks of ". . . the public interest in vigilant enforcement of the antitrust
laws through the instrumentality of the private treble-damage action."
57. That is, an acquisition which is actually, rather than only potentially, anti-
competitive should be viewed as violative of § 7. If the converse were true, i.e. all
violations of § 7 were, by definition, only potentially, and never actually restraints of
trade, the argument that Section 7 could never. support a private recovery would be
greatly strengthened.
58. 1950, U.S. CODE AND CONG. RECORD, 4295.
59. Id. at 4296.
308
Vol. 1: 298
Treble Damage Actions
which may have existed.60 Though the history does speak of incip-
iency, nowhere is it indicated that Section 7 might not, in fact, be vio-
lated by an actual and not a potential monopoly; nor is there any logical
reason why such a negative inference must be drawn from the language
of the act. In this regard, one commentator has noted:
One plausible interpretation of Clayton 7 ... is that while in
principle the section was meant to apply more to probable than to
actual restraints in trade, any hypothesis that the sole test for vio-
lation is probability goes further than Congress intended. It could
be argued that Clayton 7 is meant to cover the whole range of
'restraints' from a probable lessening in competition in the future to
just short of a Sherman Act violation. 61
It would seem that there are two possible bases for holding that a viola-
tion of Section 7 could support a judgment for money damages under
Section 4: 1) that there was, in fact, an actual lessening of competi-
tion as a result of the illegal acquisition; and 2) though the lessening
of competition remained potential and speculative, that certain parties
suffered actual and determinable damages as a result of that acquisi-
tion.6 2
DETERMINATION OF DAMAGES
Assuming, arguendo, that a cause of action under Section 4 of the
Clayton Act will lie for a Section 7 violation, there remains the problem
of the measure of damages in such an action. Thus, though there ap-
pears to be no reason, at least theoretically, why a Section 7 violation
cannot contain all the elements necessary to the maintenance of a
treble damage action,63 establishing those elements to the satisfaction
of the courts may prove more difficult.64
The requisite elements of a treble damage action are generally con-
sidered to be: 1) a violation of an antitrust law by the defendant; 2)
an injury to the plaintiff's business or property;6 3) such injury must
60. D. MARTIN, MERGERS AND THE CLAYTON ACT, 235 (1959), quoting Senator Ke-
fauver,
The bill is not complicated. It proposes simply to plug the loophole in Sec-
tions 7 and 11 of the Clayton Act.
(See further H. R. Report #515, 80th Congress, 1st Session, at 4). See also Brown
Shoe v. United States, supra note 15 ". . . there is no doubt that Congress did wish to
"plug the loophole' and to include within the coverage of the act the acquisition of
assets no less than the acquisition of stock."
61. 42S. CAL. L. REV. 460, 469 (1969).
62. Julius M. Ames Co. v. Bostitch, Inc., 240 F. Supp. 521, 523 (S.D.N.Y. 1965).
63. See generally for the elements which must be alleged and provided in private
actions, Continental Ore Co. v. Union Carbide & Carbon Corp., 289 F.2d 86 (9th
Cir. 1961).
64. Gottesman v. General Motors, 5 CCH TRADE REG. REP. Par. 73,127 (S.D.N.Y.
March 30, 1970).
65. "Business" includes not only a commercial or industrial enterprise or estab-
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be different from that sustained by the public generally;66 and 4) the
plaintiffs loss must appear to have been proximately caused by reason
of the defendant's illegal acts.67
Most plaintiffs in well pleaded cases will probably be able to establish
the first two elements of the cause of action. The latter two, however,
may present a critical barrier which must be crossed.6 8 Two recent
cases illustrate the difficulties involved. In Dole Valve Co. v. Perfection
Bar Equipment"9 the defendant in a patent infringement suit filed a
counterclaim based upon an alleged violation of Section 7 of the Clayton
Act. The defendant maintained that as a result of the merger which
had occurred, competition in the beverage dispensing equipment mar-
ket had been substantially impaired, and alleged further that it had lost
eight specifically enumerated sales to the competing firm. The court
held that there was no "evidence that the acquisition was in any
way responsible for those lost sales." The court further indicated that
in order to recover treble damages a plaintiff must not only establish
that he "suffered some special damages to his business as a direct
and proximate result of the acquisition," but that "the injury must
result from the lessened competition or monopoly itself."70
The second recent decision dealing with the problem was rendered
in the remanded case of Gottesman v. General Motors.71  The court
held that the plaintiffs had failed to prove that DuPont's stock interest
lishment, but also the employment or occupation by which a person earns a living."
64 COLUM. L. REV. 570, 577 (1964).
66. Timberlake, The Legal Injury Requirements in Treble Damage Actions Under
the Antitrust Laws, 30 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 231 (1961); Clune v. Publishers' Association
of New York City, 214 F. Supp. 520, 525 (S.D.N.Y. 1963).
67. Peterson v. Bordon Co., 50 F.2d 644 (7th Cir. 1931).
68. While the plaintiff must prove that the injury to him was distinct from one
sustained by the general public, he no longer need prove injury to the public as well
as to himself. Radovich v. National Football League, 352 U.S. 445 (1957). He need
only prove that defendant's illegal acts were a substantial factor in his injury and not
that they were the sole cause .of such injury. 64 COLUM. L. REV. 570 (1964). Nor is
he required to prove the amount of damages with any degree of exactness; Bigelow v.
R.K.O. Radio Pictures, Inc., 327 U.S. 251 (1946); Eastman Kodak Co. of New York
& Southern Photo Materials Co., 273 U.S. 359, 379 (1927); Story Parchment Co. v.
Paterson Parchment Paper Co., 282 U.S. 555, 563 (1931); the proof offered need only
be sufficient to take the ascertainment of damages out of the range of mere guess-
work or speculation.
69. 5 CCH TRADE REG. REP. Par. 73,129 (N.D. Ill. April 3, 1970).
70. Id. at p. 88438. This language of the court seems to indicate a repudiation of
the second of the two damage theories posited as possible bases for Section 7 treble
damage actions. See p. 309, supra. The court's position seems sound only if it may be
assumed that Congress in enacting Section 7 as amended intended to protect only those
private parties who were injured as a result of actual restraints of trade, and that the
"incipiency" standard of the statute was only a preventive measure taken to protect
the public in general. It is less than completely clear that this was the case.
71. 5 CCH TRADE REG. REP. Par. 73,127 (S.D.N.Y. March 30, 1970). This de-
cision followed the remand of the case by the court of appeals in Gottesman II
previously noted. It was rendered by the same judge, Judge Metzner, who has tried
the case in the district court since its inception.
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in General Motors caused General Motors to purchase its automotive
finishes and fabrics from DuPont; and further, that plaintiffs had failed
to prove injury to General Motors (monetary loss) in that they had not
shown that General Motors could have purchased materials of like
quality from other sources at lower prices.72
These cases may be a reasonable indication of the problem plaintiff's
counsel may be confronted with in establishing the existence of damages
in Section 7 treble damage actions.
CONCLUSION
The trend evidenced by the decisions of the court of appeals in
Dailey and Gottesman II, that Section 7 is an "antitrust" act within the
purview of Section 4 (i.e. one, for the violation of which, a treble dam-
age action may lie) is a sound course.
It seems likely that the courts will encounter certain problems in de-
termining the extent of recovery, if any, to which plaintiffs will be en-
titled as a result of defendants' violations of Section 7.7" These prob-
lems seems to be capable of resolution however. The courts have
shown little difficulty in awarding treble damages to private litigants in
actions based upon violations of Sections 2 T7 and 375 of the Clayton
Act, both of which sections contain the same "may be" language as
Section 7.76
It should be noted, however, that Section 2, which deals with price
discrimination, and Section 3, which proscribes tying arrangements and
72. Id. at p. 88,432.
73. I.e. Proof of the fact of actual injury, Karseal Corp. v. Richfield Oil Co., 221
F.2d 358 (9th Cir. 1955); Proof of private injury, Utah Gas Pipe Lines Corp. v. El
Paso Natural Gas, 223 F. Supp. 955 (D. Utah 1964); Proof of the amount of damages,
Bigelow, 327 U.S. 251 (1946); Keogh v. Chicago & Northwestern Railway Company,
260 U.S. 156 (1922). The plaintiff may recover for (1) lost profits which could have
been earned if the market were freely competitive, (2) increased costs of business ac-
tually transacted, (3) the decrease in value of investment in tangible or intangible
property. Timberlake, The Legal Injury Requirements and Proof of Damages in Treble
Damages Actions under the Antitrust Laws, 30 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 231 (1961).
74. 15 U.S.C. § 13(a) (1964) "It shall be unlawful for any person engaged in
commerce . . . to discriminate in price . . . where the effect of such discrimination
may be substantially to lessen competition or to tend to create a monopoly." (empha-
sis supplied)
75. 15 U.S.C. § 14 (1964), "It shall be unlawful for any person engaged in com-
merce . . . to lease or make a sale . . . on the condition . . . that the lessee or pur-
chaser thereof shall not use or deal in the goods . . of a competitor or competitors
of the lessor or seller, where the effect of such lease, sale or contract for sale or such
condition, agreement or understanding may be to substantially lessen competition or
tend to create a monopoly" (emphasis supplied).
76. See, e.g. Hartley and Parker, Inc. v. Florida Beverage Corp., 307 F.2d 916(5th Cir. 1962); and Kidd v. Esso Standard Oil Co., 295 F.2d 497 (6th Cir. 1961); Ed-
ward H. Levi, The DuPont Case and Sec. 7 of the Clayton Act, in II HOFFMAN'S ArmN-
TRUST LAW AND TECHNIQUES, 381 (1963); See also 29 Omo ST. L. REV. 756 (1968)
which states that Section 3 contains the same incipiency test as Section 7.
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exclusive dealing contracts, are concerned with practices which are, by
their nature, more likely to cause competitive injury than the acquisi-
tions with which Section 7 deals. Consequently, establishing a causal
connection between the statutory violation and the injury to the plain-
tiffs business or property is likely to be somewhat more difficult in
Section 7 cases. Nevertheless, it appears likely that the potential exist-
ence of treble damage actions brought under Section 4 will provide an
increasingly strong deterrent to future mergers which might be violative
of Section 7.
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